The importance of copper in New Spain's economy is manifest in the many ways it was used. These uses ranged from coinage, to armaments, to innumerable articles of industrial, domestic, and artistic use, and, in nonmetallic form, to processing silver ore. Not only did uses proliferate during the colonial period, but also amounts needed increased at an accelerating pace, a trend related to the mother country's increasing involvement in wars and to the stimulation of colonial economies that resulted from the liberalization of trade in the late eighteenth century. Concern over adequacy of copper supply began to be noticeable in the early part of that century and became intense during its last two decades when a supply problem of crisis proportions developed.
This paper attempts to analyze the conditions of supply and demand that affected the copper industry, how they contributed to the crisis, and how the government tried to resolve it.
Sources of Demand
In the eyes of the Crown copper for use in making silver and gold coins commanded the highest priority, followed by armaments, utensils for the manufacture of sugar and processing of silver ore, and, lastly, articles for various other industrial and domestic use 1 . In New Spain the principal use of copper in coinage was as an alloy to give gold and silver coins greater durability. Copper was refined for this purpose by a contractor who also made bronze instruments (fielatura) used by the mint (Casa de Moneda) to check the accuracy of weights and measures. Copper was occasionally supplied to mints in Spain, and on at least one *) I am indebted to Peter and Judith Bakewell and Robert Kern for their critical review of the manuscript. -Abbreviations: AGI Archivo General de Indias, Seville -AGN Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico -AHH Aichivo Histórico de Hacienda, Mexico -CDH Centro de Documentación Histórica. Microfilm of the Biblioteca del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico -CDHCEx Colección de documentos para la historia del comercio exterior de México.
x ) AGN, Minería, v. 132, exp. 1, . The following discussion does not include all uses of copper, but those that are mentioned in documents scattered throughout a number of volumes of the Ramo de Minería, AGN. occasion the government in Manila requested copper with which to make quartos. At various times the minting of small-denomination copper coins in New Spain was considered, but, except for a period in the 1540s, no action was taken. Because the need for such coins was great, some merchants issued their own, often made of copper, but circulation of these tokens was limited 2 .
In the early colonial period the demand for copper for armaments was to make artillery pieces for use in the Indies, but by the early eighteenth century the principal demand was to supply the cannon foundries in Spain, especially those in Seville and Barcelona. Armature for warships (fonos de navios) manufactured in a plant near Ferrol was another source of demand, as was the brass factory in Alcaraz. Demand in the colonies came mainly from Manila where a foundry was established in the early 1780s to make artillery for defense of the city and of American ports such as San Francisco, Monterrey, San Bias, and Acapulco. When Philippine copper deposits proved inadequate, the governor turned to New Spain because Chinese copper, the only other alternative, was too expensive. The copper was shipped from Acapulco as ballast on the Manila galleon and occasionally included copper from Peru which was transshipped through that port 3 .
The making of sugar was an important industry in the American colonies, and the many large and small mills required numerous articles made of copper or bronze. The most important items were vats (calderas, fondos) of various sizes used in reducing the cane juice. Copper was also used to make grinding cylinder casings (camisas) and gearing parts (dientes) for crushing mills. The distillation of brandy ftom cane juice (aguardiente de caña) created still another source of demand for copper utensils. In New Spain demand for copper in the sugar industry came mainly from mills in the Southern Escarpment, in the vicinity of places such as Cuernavaca, Yautepec, Cuautla Amilpas, Chietla, Izúcar, and Córdoba (see map). Copper was also shipped to Cuba for use in its expanding sugar industry. Other over-2 ) AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 11, f. 259; y. 18, exp.4; v. 157, exp. 3 f.llvandexp. 4, f. 127 . Modesto Bargall ó, La minería y la metalurgia en la America española durante la época colonial, México and Buenos Aires 1955, p. 350. Luis Chávez O r o 7. c o, ed., CEHCEx, Mexico 1958-62, ser. 1, v. 4, pp. 54-54 . Small-denomination copper coins were issued by the government in the 1540s, but coinage was discontinued because the coins were not accepted by the populace. Arthur Scott Alton, Antonio de Mendoza, First Viceroy of New Spain, Durham, N.C., 1927, pp. 113-114 seas shipments of copper to Campeche, El Carmen, Tabasco, Caracas, Maracaibo, Cartagena, and New Orleans went, in part, to sugar mills 4 . Copper was utilized in the silver mining industry in a number of important ways. Copper sulphate (jmagistral) derived from low grade copper pyrite ore which was crushed to a powder and roasted, acted as a reagent that permitted silver to amalgamate readily with mercury. The separation of silver from mercury was achieved by heating the amalgam under a bellshaped hood {capellina) made of beaten copper or bronze. A variation of the amalgamation process involved prior heating of the ingredients either in copper cauldrons or on revolving copper discs set up in the furnace, but this practice was not widespread in New Spain. In cases where silver was smelted rather than amalgamated, the receptacles were made of copper. Air was introduced into the furnace by means of bellows whose nozzle (cañón) was placed in a funnel (alcribís). These nozzles and funnels were made of copper or bronze as were a variety of other utensils needed to process silver ore. Subsidiary industries also required copper. For example, the Crown monopoly supplying blasting powder (Real Fábrica de Pólvora) needed it for mortars (imorteros), and its contractors who processed the saltpeter (salitreros) used vessels (pailas) made of it 5 .
Copper goods needed in industries such as sugar milling and silver mining were not only made on the premises of these establishments but purchased from specialized metalworkers. The guild (gremio) of coppersmiths (caldereteros or caldereros) organized in México and Puebla was composed of master artisans who maintained workshops and produced a wide range of copper and bronze goods for sale to the public. Santa Clara and Pátzcuaro were other important copperworking centers (see map). The main items of production were copper vessels of various sizes, some tub-like (fondos, pailas, calderas) and others round bottomed (cazos, peroles) , that were used in a variety of businesses such as slaughter houses, butcher shops, soap works, public baths, and pharmacies. Other copper items made for phar-4 ) AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, ff. 300v-301. -AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 11, f. 25 9v; v. 19, exp. 7; v. 62, exp. 2, f. 5v; v. 132, exp Cuba, 1760 -1860 , trans. Cedric Belfrage, New York 1976 5) AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 3, v. 32, exp. 6, v. 98, exp. 4, . P. J. Β a k e w e 11, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas 1546 -1700 , Cambridge 1971 Brassmakers (latoneros), wiremakers (alambreros), silversmiths (plateros), and goldsmiths (tiradores de oro) constituted other classes of metalworkers that used copper. Silversmiths used it to strengthen the silver used in tableware (vajilla). They also executed works in bronze or gilded bronze that were used as church fittings (crujías, cipreses, barandales) or altar pieces (servicio de las iglesias). The latter items were made of brass for use in poor churches. Goldsmiths used copper to make ornaments that were then covered with silver and gilded (trabajos en falso). By the late eighteenth century copper engraving had become well established in México and Puebla, opening up another source of demand. In this period there were some 20 engravers producing coins, medals, and engravings for book illustrations and prints. Statuary was another obvious source of demand for copper 7 .
Sources of Supply
The principal source of copper in New Spain throughout the colonial period was the province of Michoacán. However, as demand for copper increased in the latter part of the eighteenth century, copper mining was stimulated elsewhere, in places such as: Sayula, Somelahuacart, Zimapan, Charcas, San José, Cuencamé, and Janos 8 (see map). In Michoacán the center of copper mining was the Real de Inguarán, but there were other mines in the area located near Apupato, Churumuco, Oropeo, and Sanchiqueo. All of these places are located in the lower Balsas basin which contains numerous deposits of copper of the porphyry type. Ore bodies frequently take the form of isolated hills in which the sulphide ores occur as a coarse stockwork that separates readily from the gangue with a blow of the hammer, yielding high grade ores of 15-75 per cent. Such ores were easily exploited with the primitive technology of both prehispanic and colonial times. The ore bodies are immense, especially that of the Cerro de Inguarán, so that despite centuries of mining, geologists who appraised the mines in the middle of the nineteenth century could say the deposits had been only slightly diminished. The same point was made repeatedly by colonial officials who stated that the supply of copper did not depend on the extent of the deposits, which they considered inexhaustible, but on the availability of labor and capital to work them 9 .
In eastern Michoacán, in the jurisdiction of Zitácuaro, were two centers devoted to copper mining: Santos Reyes and Chirangangeo. The latter was in operation as early as 1728, its mines located in the Cerro de Tiamoro where an ore body similar to that of Inguarán was exploited. Mines in this area were known not only for the production of metallic copper but also magistral which was supplied to the silver mining centers of central and northern New Spain 10 .
In the intendency of Guadalajara copper was mined from time to time in the districts of Sayula and Autlán. The Sayula mines, actually located near the village of Chiquilixpan to the northwest, seem to have been the more important. They were reported abandoned in 1748, but in 1799 thè viceroy noted that they were a regular source of supply 11 .
Copper mines in the jurisdiction of Perote, Veracruz, were discovered in 1763 but remained little known as late as the 1780s despite their advantageous location for shipment of copper abroad. They were most actively worked from the early 1790s when the demand for copper was escalating. The veins, which cross the canyon of Somelahuacan at different angles were readily accessible and yielded a high grade ore 12 . Efforts to increase the supply of copper led officials to investigate more distant sources. The survey of copper mining commissioned by the viceroy in 1783, although centered on Michoacán, also included Nuevo Santander where copper had been discovered in the Sierra de Tamaulipas by miners looking for silver and gold. The deposits were not worked because the miners did not know how to process the ore and had no established means of selling the metal. However, by the end of the 1790s copper was being mined in the Real de San José in the jurisdiction of the Villa de San Carlos and shipped to Veracruz from the port of Soto la Marina. Deposits were of the porphyry type which were exploited where weathering exposed concentrations near the surface 13 .
Mines in the Valle de Matehuala, jurisdiction of Santa María de las Charcas, had become a regular source of copper by the late 1790s. Although the ore was difficult to smelt because of the complexity of minerals it contained, the resulting copper was of a quality useful for the all-important purpose of casting armaments. The Real de Zimapan remained a minor source of supply despite its proximity to the chief centers of demand because it produced copper of low quality and consequently limited utility. By contrast, the discovery in 1803 of a deposit of high quality copper in the Sierra de Janos prompted the Crown to retain ownership of it in order to insure its production for the mint, in spite of its great distance from the capital 14 .
Although there were numerous reports of copper deposits in Durango, this region contributed very little to production. As early as 1599 a copper deposit was discovered in the vicinity of Indé, but it was not worked because at the time the process of separating the copper from the silver in the ore made it too costly to produce. In the latter eighteenth century interest in Durango as a source of copper was renewed with attention focused on deposits in the vicinity of the Real de Cuencamé. However, in 1788 the intendent of Durango informed the viceroy that although there were reports of copper mines in his jurisdiction, none was worked. The intendent wrote in a 1794 report that these deposits had never been exploited and provided as an explanation the statement of a local miner who pointed out that the copper deposits were minor formations within what was principally a silverbearing ore body and that the copper ore was neither of sufficient abundance or grade to warrant working. Other disadvantages that he cited were the higher costs of labor and freight incurred by miners in Durango com-pared with those in Michoacán. However, occasional shipments of copper from this area were made, such as one from the Hornillos mine in 1810
1S .
It is difficult from the fragmentary data available to rank with precision the various copper producing centers, but there is no doubt that the mines of south-central Michoacán remained the largest producers throughout the colonial period. The most important of these was the mine located in the Real de Inguarán that was owned by the Crown and worked by a lessee. Production from the mines in this area was 3,050 quintales (qq.) in 1793. Although the same figures were reported again in 1801 an error is likely for the price rise of 1799 reportedly caused production to double. During that same year production from mines in eastern Michoacán reached a total of 1,025 qq. The following year the intendent of San Luis Potosí reported 1,092 qq. for mines in the jurisdiction of Charcas and 467 qq. for the Real de San José. Annual production in Somelahuacan was probably about 1,000 Because the total in Table 1 is similar to total production estimated from other sources, this break-down of production might also be a fair approximation of the relative importance of the different copper mining centers, keeping in mind that production varied considerably from year to year and that there were other centers contributing small amounts of copper.
Amounts Demanded Domestic and overseas demand for copper grew at an accelerated rate during the latter part of the eighteenth century, creating a crisis that was particularly acute during the 1790s. Before discussing amounts demanded it ls ) AGI, Guadalajara, leg. 6. ACN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, ff. 220-231. AGN. Minería, v. 29, exp. 3, f. 127; v. 157, exp. 5,f. lOv. 16) AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, f. 331. AGN, Minería, v. 30, exp. 7, f. 154v; v.62 , exp. 1. CDH, Michoacán, roll 7. The quintal consists of 100 pounds (libras) or about .046 metric tons.
should be noted that these amounts are based on requests for copper made to the treasury (Real Hacienda) in México. Although one would expect government demands to be channeled through the treasury, it was also true for the private sector after 1780 when the Crown ordered all copper produced to be sold to the treasury in order to insure an adequate supply for Spain. To be sure, not all producers complied with this order, and some unknown amount of demand was satisfied on the black market.
The largest demand for copper came from the armament factories in Spain which, with their expanding production and high priority, made copper scarce for other purposes. In 1748 the Crown ordered 3,000 qq. to be shipped each year to the artillery foundries in Seville and Barcelona; in 1792 the amount was increased to 2,500 qq. and 5,000 qq. respectively. Added to this was a demand for 2,000 qq. of copper each year from the brass factory in Alcaraz. Besides these annual quotas, sources of supply were occasionally burdened with extraordinary demands such as the Crown order of November 16, 1780, to send 15,000 qq. on the first warship to leave for Spain. Increased naval warfare led the government in 1794 to build a factory near Ferrol for the manufacture of armored plating for warships. The initial supply of copper needed for this facility, 10,000 qq., was sought from both New Spain and Peru. The construction of an armament factory in Manila in 1780 also added to the demand for copper. The governor ordered 2,000 qq. from New Spain and implied that similar amounts would be needed each year 17 .
The minting of silver and gold coins grew throughout the eighteenth century, starting at 7-8 million pesos in value, increasing to 10-13 million pesos by mid-century, and reaching a peak of 21-25 million pesos in the 1790s. Although the proportion of copper used was small, about one part copper to 180 parts silver, this three-fold expansion of coinage obviously brought an increased demand for copper from the mint. In the 1750s yearly demand was about 600 qq.", by the 1780s it was 1,400 to 1,500 qq.;and in the 1790s, about 1,500 to 2,000 qq.
18 .
Growth of the sugar industry in the late eighteenth century added greatly to the demand for copper both to make and repair utensils. Treasury offi-") AGN, AHH, teg. 455-2, doc. 6. AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, ff. 207-207v. AGN, Mineria, v. 34, exp. 255; v. 52, exp. 5; v. 132, exp. 1, ff. 10 and 191v-192v cials in New Spain estimated that between 1786 and 1801 expansion of sugar milling and development of a cane brandy industry caused demand for copper in this sector to triple. This demand amounted to a drain on treasury stocks of about 500 qq. each year in 1798 and 1799. The Cuban sugar industry experienced an even greater expansion. The opening of Cuba to trade during the English occupation of 1762-1763, the subsequent easing of Spanish trade restrictions, immigration of French planters from Haiti after 1789, and the elimination of restrictions on the importation of black slaves after that date all contributed to the large-scale development of the Cuban sugar industry in which annual production rose from about 2,600 tons in 1760 to 33,000 tons in 1799. The increase in numbers of mills and their capacity caused an unprecedented demand for copper which, because it couds not be met by local production, required imports from New Spain. By the mid-1790s Cuban sugar mill owners were requesting an average of 700 qq. of copper each year and in 1798 a flood of requests reached the extraordinary total of some 5,900 qq. Individual requests that year were especially large, and treasury officials suspected that many were inflated so the mill owners might have an extra supply of copper to sell at a time when demand was at fever pitch. The following year demand subsided to about 850 qq. This abrupt decline was probably related to the fact that mill owners were waiting for their orders of the previous year to be filled. Also, treasury officials in New Spain may have told the governor in Havana not to accept any more requests for shipments of copper because they could not be met. After 1800 the sugar boom began to level off, and demand for copper did not rise appreciably again 19 .
Demand for copper by silver miners is virtually impossible to estimate with accuracy from the limited data available. Treasury records contain only 6 requests made over a period from 1789 to 1802, a situation suggesting that the records are incomplete or that silver miners were able to satisfy a large part of their needs in the black market. The amounts requested were small, ranging between 30 and 150 qq., the latter figure claimed by the miner Juan Antonio del Castillo y Llata to be the amount needed each year for his 9 smelting establishments with their 17 furnaces. It seems likely that the amount of demand in the silver mining industry would be at least of an 1») AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 2, f. 53, AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp, 11, f. 259v; v.61 order of magnitude similar to that of the domestic sugar industry, and the demand estimated for the latter, 500 qq., is probably too low 20 . The need for magistral in the amalgamation process constituted a separate demand. Quantitative data are lacking because the government did not attempt to control its distribution -there being no demand to ship this commodity to Spain -but the director of the mining court (Real Tribunal General de Minería), writing in 1785, noted that magistral was consumed in large quantities and that there was a shortage of it in the silver mining districts. The rise in demand was undoubtedly related to the growing proportion of silver ore that was treated by amalgamation rather than smelting, a proportion that increased from 66 per cent in 1763 to 85 per cent by 1806. In 1817 the secretary of the Veracruz merchants guild (Consulado de Veracruz) estimated the amount of magistral entering commerce each year to be about 90,00 qq.
21 .
The demand from metalworking industries is also difficult to gauge, especially because the requests for copper, with a few exceptions, originated in México and so, as will be discussed below, did not reflect demand from the important copper-working centers of Puebla, Santa Clara, and Pátzcuaro. In México yearly demand was about 1,000 qq. according to the inspector (iveedor) of the coppersmiths' guild. In addition there were occasional extraordinary demands such as the 500 qq. requested in 1798 by the director of sculpture of the Royal Academy of San Carlos for an equestrian statue of King Charles IV.
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By the late 1790s demand for copper stood at an all-time high. A tentative estimate of annual demand is given in Table 2 . 20 ) AGN, Minería, v. 98, exp. 4, AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 8, f. 190; v. 30, exp. 7, f. 151; v. 219, exp. 16 , f. 1. An examination of the supply side of the ledger will show that even these conservative estimates of demand could not be met.
Inadequacy of copper supply in,Spain and its colonies was evident by the early eighteenth century. The Crown order of October 1,1717, to the viceroy of New Spain to ship as much copper as possible to Spain was an indication of this situation, as was the fact that it took four years to obtain the 4,000 qq. the viceroy deemed sufficient to fill the order. The bishop of Michoacán explained to the viceroy that supplies were not forthcoming because copper dealers (rescatadores) who could purchase the metal in Michoacán for 9 or 10 pesos per quintal and sell it in México at the open market price of 18 or 20 pesos had no incentive to sell it to the treasury for its price of 16 pesos. Only the concessionaire (asentista) of the mine owned by the Crown was obliged to sell to the treasury and his production was too small to meet the Crown's needs. Nevertheless, the Crown, wanting to hold down its expenditures for copper, refused to raise its price and attempted to increase supply by pressuring the concessionaire to produce more. The lat-23 ) The most uncertain estimates are the amounts for domestic sugar mills and silver processing plants which are undoubtedly too low. The figure for metalworking industries is a rough estimate derived by increasing the demand in México by one-half to represent demand in other copper-working centers. The estimate of demand in Cuba is the result of averaging the amounts requested in the years 1795 through 1799. In the miscellaneous category are included demands from other American colonies, such as 250 qq. requested in 1798 by the commandant of New Orleans for local sugar mill owners and 160 qq. needed to make copper vessels for indigo processors in Guatemala. AGN, Minería, v. 32, exp. 6; v. 128, exp. 6. Amounts Supplied ter, however, was not immune to the higher prices offered in the market. Treasury officials, noting the case of one concessionaire who delivered only some 3,000 qq. to the treasury during his 10 year tenure, concluded that he must not have sold all of the copper he produced to the treasury 24 .
Available statistics indicate that for the period 1775-1781 annual purchases of copper by the treasury, excluding amounts sent to the mint, averaged only 2,500 qq., not even enough to meet the quota of 3,000 qq. for the cannon foundries of Seville and Barcelona. An increasingly unsatisfactory supply situation eventually led the Crown to modify its position. In 1780 it not only raised the official price of copper but instituted a monopoly (estanco) on its distribution. The price was raised from 16 to 18 pesos per quintal, except to the concessionaire who continued to receive 15 1/2 pesos. The monopoly did not involve creation of a separate bureaucracy, but consisted of the requirement to sell all copper produced to the treasury in México, with officials in the mining areas instructed to issue transit permits (guías) for that destination only 25 .
These measures did have the effect of increasing sales of copper to the treasury. During 1782-1783 purchases averaged 4,000 qq., and in 1785 rose to 5,436 qq. Despite these increases treasury officials were not able to fill readily the Crown order for 15,000 qq. issued November 16, 1780. By mid-1783 they had collected 9,900 qq. but only 5,030 qq. could be sent to Spain because 2,000 qq. were needed to fill another order for the new artillery foundry in Manila and 2,870 qq. were needed to supply the mint and blasting powder factory in México. Furthermore, some copper delivered to the treasury was so full of impurities that it had to be rejected 26 .
Although the supply of copper continued to increase under the pressure of repeated Crown orders and stricter enforcement of the monopoly, demand outpaced supply by a considerable margin. Annual treasury purchases averaged 7,400 qq. over the decade 1784-1793 and during the latter half of the 1790s they ranged between 9-10,000 qq., but when these figures are compared with the amount of demand shown in Table 2 , the extent of the copper crisis is plainly evident. The gap between supply and demand for various users can be seen by comparing Table 2 Table 3 27 . Table 3 Proposed Allocation of New Spain's Copper Production, 1798
The armament plants in Spain were a large factor in the escalating demand for copper. During the decade 1774-1783 shipments to Spain averaged 2,040 qq. each year and, even though they increased to 5,550 qq. during the following decade, this amount was still little more than half of the 9,500 qq. then demanded by the Crown. Unable to meet the regular quotas imposed by the Crown, treasury officials in New Spain found it impossible to fill the demand for 10,000 qq. that was made in 1794 to supply the new naval armament facility built near Ferrol 28 .
Realizing that New Spain could not meet its demands, the Crown hoped to make up the deficit with increased shipments from Peru. Data provided by officials in Cádiz revealed that during the Ave years 1788-1792 only four shipments of copper totalling 4,160 qq. had been received. Furthermore, the viceroy of Peru had not responded to orders issued in 1792 to increase copper shipments. The Crown then turned to the viceroy of New Spain for information about Peruvian copper supply because Peruvian copper destined for Spain was transshipped from Acapulco through Veracruz. In response the viceroy reported that the supply of copper from Peru was too erratic to be relied on 29 .
Cuba had been an important supplier of copper in the early seventeenth century, shipping over 1,000 qq. annually to Spain from 1607 to 1626, but a change in the lessee of the Crown-owned mines brought a decline in pro-27 ) AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, f. 282. AGN, Minería, v. 30, exp. 7, f. 154v; v. 61, exp. 4, . Calculation of the 7,400 qq. figure was made assuming that shipments to Spain,for which data are available, represented two thirds of total production. 
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duction that continued throughout the eighteenth century. In reply to a Crown order issued in December 1748, to ship as much copper as possible the governor stated that the mines, although rich, had been abandoned for many years because there was no one with enough money to develop them. Copper production, which only amounted to about 175 qq. each year, was accounted for by nuggets of native copper picked up in streams by slaves living in the vicinity of the mines. Cuba, which could not meet even its own needs for copper, obviously was not in a position so supply Spain 30 .
Copper production in Spain itself had been increasing, but not enough to diminish the need for ever greater supplies from the colonies. The principal copper mining area in Spain, Rio Tinto, reached a peak of production in 1797, but it only amounted to about 5,000 qq. and after the turn of the century war conditions curtailed production. Sweden and Hungary were sources of supply, but ones which the Crown wished to avoid because payments to them were a drain on its silver reserves and shipments were subject to almost continuous wartime hazards. However, because domestic and colonial supplies of copper were never adequate, dependence on foreign copper continued. In 1796 the Crown found it necessary to purchase in the market in Cádiz 17,000 qq. of copper, presumably of foreign origin 31 .
So great was the need for copper in Spain that the following year the Crown granted a Cádiz merchant the right to purchase 30,000 qq. in the market in New Spain, hoping that private enterprise could bring forth supplies that bureaucratic control could not. This copper was to be sold to the Crown for use in its armament factories. Treasury officials in New Spain were so taken aback by the large amount and so opposed to this departure from established procedure whereby they controlled the distribution of copper that they succeeded in delaying execution of the order for years 32 .
Although government facilities did suffer from the copper shortage, it was the public in New Spain as producers or consumers of copper goods that was most severly affected by the scarcity of this metal. This situation is seen most clearly in the industries that made copper or copper-alloy goods. In the early days of the monopoly supply problems in this sector were not acute because many copper producers and traders did not comply with the requirement to sell all of their copper to the treasury. However, by the late 1780s complaints of a shortage of copper began to appear in treasury records. In June, 1789, a leading coppersmith requested 100 qq. from 30 ) AGI, Indiferente, leg. 1807. Levi Marreio y Artiles, Cuba: Economía y Sociedad, Madrid 1975, v. 3, p. 283. 31) AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. l,f. 291. AGN,Minería, v. 205,exp . l,f. 1. William G. Nash, The Rio Tinto Mine: Its History and Romance, London 1904, pp. 159-165 and 226. 3 2) AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 11, f. 272; v. 62, exp. 2, 25, 56, 77 .
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Elinoie M. Barrett the treasury claiming that his business had been virtually defunct during the previous year for lack of copper. Although his request was approved by the viceroy, he received only 30 qq., with the remaining 70 qq. held for distribution to other metalsmiths. It was presumed that he did not need 100 qq. himself but intended to sell part of it at a higher price. The viceroy's action was calculated to prevent profit-taking at the expense of other, poorer metalworkers who could then buy directly from the treasury, paying the fixed price of 18 1/2 pesos per quintal which was only a half peso above the price that the treasury itself paid for copper. However, as will be seen later, the treasury was not prepared to fill many small requests for copper 33 .
Treasury officials noted in their 1789 report to the viceroy that failure to grant artisans' requests would encourage surreptitious mining and contraband trade, the existence of which was, in fact, well established. To eliminate, or, at least, minimize such activities they recommended that the public be guaranteed a larger part of the copper produced, suggesting a one-third share, with the other two-thirds allocated to various government uses. In practice, however, two-thirds of copper production, or more, was assigned wholly to Spain and the remainder had to satisfy all other demands, including the mint and the canon foundry in Manila, both of which had higher priority than the public in New Spain 34 .
The copper shortage among metalworking artisans became particularly acute in the late 1790s, especially in México where copper goods were scarce, expensive, and mostly of poor quality because they were made of old, reworked copper. The coppersmiths' guild was in a deplorable state with only four shops still in business and those operating at a reduced rate with periodic shut-downs. By 1801 there were three shops, only one of which was actually operating. There were just three or four master craftsmen left and their skills were not highly regarded. Since 1785 only one person had taken the qualifying examination in this field 35 .
Deterioration of the metalworkers' position developed as the government obtained greater and greater compliance with its policy of monopoly. In the capital government control over the copper supply was virtually complete and artisans there had no other source except the treasury. They complained that their requests were frequently denied or thé amount granted greatly reduced. The official procedures required for application involved 33) AGN, Minería, v. 132, exp. 3, ) AGN, Minería, v. 132, exp. 3, f. 274v. 35 ) Discussion of the condition of metalworking industries is based on reports made to the treasury by: Manuel Mendoza, inspector of the guild of coppersmiths, 1795 (AGN, Minería, v. 30, exp. 7, ; Manuel Tolsa, director of sculpture of the Royal Academy of San Carlos, 1801 (AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 11, ; and Salvador de la Vega, leading coppersmith and copper refiner for the mint, 1802 (AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 13, . not only considerable delays and loss of time by the artisan, but also the payment of fees that raised the effective price from the official 18 1/2 pesos per quintal to 22-23 pesos. Furthermore, the treasury would not sell small amounts of copper. Such a situation obviously worked to the detriment of the small, poor artisan who had to close his business if he could not obtain copper from a larger shop. Treasury officials reinforced this trend by refusing to approve requests from the larger shops for amounts beyond their own needs, as in the case cited previously.
In Puebla, and presumably also in other copper-working centers such as Santa Clara and Pátzcuaro, the supply situation was not so critical because weaker government control permitted a contraband trade in copper to exist. These places were advantageously located with regard to sources of supply in Michoacán and Veracruz and also to the main sources of domestic demand. Puebla was well situated to supply the principal sugar producing zone of the Southern Escarpment, and Santa Clara-Pátzcuaro similarly situated to supply sugar mills as well as the silver mining regions of both central and northern New Spain. The requirement to first deliver all copper to the treasury in México clearly went against older-established and more economically logical patterns of supply and resistance to it continued despite penalties of confiscation and fines 36 .
In 1797 treasury officials reported to the viceroy that miners sold copper for 22 pesos per quintal to dealers who resold it for 26 pesos in Puebla. They pointed out that, given these prices, it would pay coppersmiths in Puebla to buy copper in México at the official price of 18 1/2 pesos and transport it to Puebla, but only if they could be assured of an adequate supply. In October 1797 the Crown ordered that all copper needed by the public should be made available. The viceroy was urged to make every effort to meet this demand because doing so would undercut the contraband trade that deprived the treasury both of taxes and of the complete control over the supply of copper that was necessary to achieve its efficient distribution, especially with Tegard to shipments to Spain. Despite increased concern to properly serve the needs of metalworkers, continued complaints of shortages indicated that this policy was not carried out. Relief for metalworking industries as well as other sectors of demand could only come when the government addressed the problems of production rather than those of distribution 37 .
») AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 8, f. 171v. AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, ff. 324v-325. AGN, Minería, v. 16, exp. 11, f. 259v .
Production Problems
Inadequacy of copper production was not caused by limited ore reserves, but by the conditions of mining. Writing about the copper mining situation in the early 1780s, the director of the mining court noted that historically copper had been a metal that brought low returns and the same observation was made a decade later by the attorney (fiscal) of the treasury. Miners had little to invest and credit form suppliers (aviadores) was scarce. The magistrate (alcalde mayor) in the Inguarán area reported to the viceroy in 1784 that miners were so in debt to their suppliers that the latter were reluctant to advance more credit. Without the capital, and often the knowledge, to exploit an ore body rationally, it was worked in a piecemeal, unplanned manner with the result that cut-offs, cave-ins, and flooding were common and much ore became inaccessible. Because the easily exploited superficial deposits had been worked over, the demand for substantially increase production could be met only by refurbishing the old underground mines or opening new ones. The scarcity of capital to accomplish this work then became an obstacle to the expansion of production 38 .
In 1784 the Banco de Avíos was created as an arm of the mining court to provide financing of capital improvements, but it did not prove effective even for the silver mining industry for which it was primarily designed. Furthermore, there was some question as to whether copper miners were eligible because they did not pay the fees which provided funds for the bank's operations. The director of the mining court stated that copper miners were eligible for loans after the needs of silver miners were satisfied but only if they paid the contribution to the mining fund 39 .
In an attempt to increase copper production, the governing body (Junta superior) of the treasury in 1793 not only permitted copper miners to deliver their copper to treasury offices in Valladolid and Veracruz in addition to the office in México, but decreed that miners making such deliveries were eligible for loans which could be repaid from future deliveries. This concession was reaffirmed in the 1799 decree which also raised the price of copper. When in 1796 a copper miner from Santos Reyes applied to the mining court for 11-12,000 pesos for drainage work and was turned down for lack of sufficient security, he resorted to the treasury whose ministers agreed to the loan in accordance with their 1793 policy. The following year they loaned 4,000 pesos to a miner from Somelahuacan. Such loans, however, were undoubtedly rare. The intendent of Valladolid reported to the viceroy in 1801 that owing to the weak financial position of copper miners not a single loan had been granted through the local treasury office. The majority of capital investments were probably financed by a few merchants who were willing to take such a high risk 40 .
The copper miners' second great problem was labor supply. This problem was a perennial one, highlighted as early as 1718 by the military commander of Michoacán in his report to the viceroy. But the problem became more acute in the latter part of the century as greater production was demanded. The inspector Coquet reported in 1783 that there were fewer than 50 workers at the Crown's mine in Inguarán, whereas optimum production required a work force of 5-600. Many mines in both the Inguarán and Zitácuaro districts were closed for lack of workers. Coquet recommended that the many small work gangs (quadrillas volantes), be concentrated in a few of the larger mines where large-scale production was possible. He noted that this reorganization could be carried out most readily with Indians who owed periodic labor (repartimiento), but suggested that the government exercise its right to press into service vagrants and criminals, the latter, however, only as a last resort 41 .
The scarcity of labor was caused primarily by low wages, but also by the location of the Michoacán mines in hot country with its reputation for discomfort and disease that repelled the highland population from which the work force was drawn. Higher wages were needed to attract and hold workers, but miners claimed that the low price of copper made it impossible to pay more. According to the director of the mining court, daily wages and rations for copper mine workers were no higher than those paid to agricultural workers despite the greater hardship and danger of mine work. Also because of the low price of copper, copper miners could not afford the <rpartido en metales> which, in the case of silver mining, gave workers a share of the ore to sell and thus supplement their wages 42 .
Even though the official price of copper was increased from 16 to 18 pesos per quintal in 1780, rising costs made it impossible for copper miners to improve their position enough to raise wages to the level needed to attract an adequate labor force. Transportation costs in particular were high because the ore was not smelted near the mines, but carried some 65 kilometers to the smelting works in Santa Clara where wood for making char-«) AGN, Civil, v. 2103, exp. 1, ff. 194, 283v-284v, 307. AGN, Minería, v. 62, exp. 1 ; v. 157, exp. 4, f. 126; v. 180, exp. 1, ff. l-2v . The province of Michoacán was known in the late eighteenth century as the Intendency of Valladolid. Its capital was Vallado lid (see map).
«i) AGN, Minería, v. 132, exp. 1, ff. 31v, v. 205, exp. l, «) AGN, Minería, v. 132, exp. 1, f. 167v. CDH, Michoacán, roll 7. coal was available. Costs of supplies were a major problem because they had to be brought into the mining areas. Foodstuffs could not be raised locally in sufficient quantity because labor was scarce and the hot, dry climate was better suited to livestock raising than farming. But even the carrying capacity for livestock was low and the beasts of burden and tallow needed in the mines were scarce and expensive 43 .
The government attempted to promote mining by granting certain concessions that would cut costs, such as exempting goods used in mining from the excise tax. In this case, too, it was not certain if the concessions applied to copper mining. Apparently the head of the mining deputation of the Real de Inguarán thought they did because in 1793 he complained to the intendent of Valladolid that the local tax official still imposed this tax on goods sent into the area for use by miners. In 1801 a Crown order decreed that miners could obtain blasting powder from the royal monopoly at cost. A copper miner in Somelahuacan who had been purchasing it on this basis had his deliveries suspended when the local tax official was informed that this privilege was intended only for miners of gold and silver. When the miner complained, the attorney of the mining court stated that the intent of the order was to make powder available at cost to all miners; however, officials of the court of audit disagreed and went so far as to state that none of the concessions granted to the mining sector were meant for other than the producers of gold or silver 44 .
Taxes were another burden, although not as great a one as they might have been if copper had been taxed in the same way as gold and silver. It is stated in the Recopilación de Leyes that miners had to pay the Crown one fifth of the value of the metal they produced. Although in most instances this tax was reduced to 10 per cent, it was still higher than the excise tax (alcabala) that had to be paid on other goods. Copper was exempted from the normal method of taxing metals as early as 1574 when officials recommended to the Crown that the excise tax, which was then only 2 per cent, be charged because copper miners were mostly poor Indians and, furthermore, so little copper was produced that the loss of revenue would be negligible. This method of taxation, once begun, was not changed even though treasury officials at various times recommended imposition of the 10 per cent tax. In 1780 the excise tax was raised from 6 to 8 per cent, but copper miners were granted some relief in that the valuation of copper for tax purposes continued to be made on the basis of 16 pesos per quintal even though the price of copper was increased to 18 pesos that same year. In addition to the excise tax, copper miners were charged 13 pesos for each shipment of copper delivered to the treasury regardless of its size. This charge forced small-scale producers to sell their copper to middlemen and lose the greater profit to be derived from selling directly to the treasury. Despite numerous petitions from the copper mining community and suggestions from the intendent of Valladolid to eliminate it, this fee continued to be charged 45 .
With rising costs and a fixed price, copper miners found themselves in a worsening position by the mid-1780s, a time when government pressure to increase production was heightening. Although there was a contraband market, the amount it could absorb was small compared with government demand and increasing government efforts to eliminate it raised the risks involved. Such was their distress that in 1786 a group of copper miners commissioned their México agents to inform the viceroy that they were not indifferent to his orders to increase production, but they needed to have the price increased to 22 pesos per quintal before they could afford to expand their mining operations. Even the attorney of the treasury agreed with this proposal, but his recommendation was not acted upon until 1799. Meanwhile copper production continued to be plagued with inadequate investment, labor shortages, high costs, and low returns 46 .
Remedies and Results
As previously mentioned, the Crown attempted to rectify the growing imbalance between supply and demand as early as 1780 by raising the official price of copper and establishing the requirement that all copper produced be sold to the treasury in México. These steps were taken in order both to encourage production and make sure that as much copper as possible was sent to Spain. The inadequacy of these measures is shown by the continuing stream of Crown orders to send more copper to Spain and by the number of recommendations to increase copper production suggested by various government officials.
One proposal to increase the supply of copper was put forward in 1783 by Bernardo Rivera Buitrón, a clerk (escribano) in the department of tributes (Contaduría de Tributos) who was seeking appointment as magistrate of Maravatio with a commission to trade in copper as a specific part of his duties. He proposed to use tribute money collected in his jurisdiction to purchase copper and then turn the metal over to the treasury at cost, in contrast to previous holders of the office who made a business of buying and selling copper for their own profit. His plan was designed not only to eliminate traders working for their own account and save the treasury money, but also to make sure that all copper produced was sent to the treasury in México. He suggested that to insure the effectiveness of the plan it would be necessary to establish in Zitácuaro a treasury office (caja marca) to weigh and mark the copper. Buitrón also proposed to encourage more mining by using his authority to obtain an adequate supply of labor and mules and by eliminating the fees for discovery and taking possession of mines which former magistrates charged. He further suggested that new mining operations be exempt from taxation for five years 47 .
Buitrón's plan fitted in with another recommended the same year by the treasury officer in charge of receiving copper shipped to México (factor oficial). Copper was not taxed until delivered to the treasury in México in order that assayers might determine its quality and set an appropriate price, one that might vary somewhat from the standard price. As a result there was ample opportunity for the diversion of copper into the contraband trade which not only reduced the supply to the treasury but also diminished tax revenues. The official suggested that these problems could be avoided if copper were taxed in the same manner as gold and silver. This plan was opposed by the treasury's attorney because it would raise the rate of taxation thus acting as a deterrent to increasing copper production and because it would require the additional expense of establishing treasury offices in copper mining districts. He also recommended against the proposal of officials of the mining court to impose on copper miners the fee for the mining fund. In both cases his views prevailed 48 .
Although the merits of suggestions such as the Buitrón plan were recognized by the Crown and viceroy, the government responded weakly, merely issuing orders to local officials to give whatever help they could to copper miners and requiring miners and traders to bring copper to the local justice for registration and marking prior to shipment to México. Local officials were again admonished to issue transit permits to México only. Compliance with these orders, as might be expected, was less than enthusiastic. First issued in August 1783, they had to be repeated in January 1784 and were not acknowledged until July and August of that year 49 .
Some government officials felt that the policies of monopoly and a fixed price for copper were in themselves obstacles to increasing copper production. A return to free trade was first brought up in a report issued by officials of the mining court in October 1785. The treasury's attorney was opposed because he felt that free trade was inconsistent with the policy of supplying as much copper as possible to Spain. He feared that not only would free trade make it difficult to secure enough copper to send to Spain, but also that manipulation of supply by traders would inflate the price of copper and increase the treasury's cost of acquiring it. By 1789 the attorney had changed his mind, realizing that the monopoly had not created a sufficient supply of copper for Spain while at the same time it had created serious shortages for other users. He recommended not only reinstating free trade but also raising the price of copper to 22 pesos per quintal as requested earlier by leaders of the copper industry. He assumed that the higher price would elicit enough additional production to fill government needs even though the still higher price in the market would divert substantial quantities of copper to the private sector 50 .
Yet when the Crown did declare a return to free trade in March 1792, there was no provision for a higher price. Furthermore, the order called for continuation of the policy to provide as much copper as possible to Spain. Under such conditions there could hardly have been free trade. In August 1794, treasury officials reported to the viceroy that with a continuing shortage of copper, there was no way to obtain enough copper to send to Spain other than to maintain the monopoly. They suggested that raising the price to 20 pesos per quintal and exempting copper sold to the treasury from the excise tax would both increase copper production and insure deliveries to treasury warehouses. Neither of these recommendations was acted upon, and the copper supply situation worsened as demand intensified during the latter 1790s 51 .
Finally, in July 1799, the Crown increased the price of copper to 22 pesos per quintal. This action had been preceded by years of disagreement among treasury officials over whether a price increase was needed. The controversy reflected a basic split between those who thought that there was potential for greatly enlarged production if the price were right, in which case distribution problems would take care of themselves, and those who thought that production could never be great enough to fill all needs and, therefore, favored government control of distribution. The 1792 declaration of free trade can be seen as a compromise between these two points of view, with the negligible results previously noted 52 . The 1799 price increase, however, brought immediate results. In December 1801, treasury officials reported to the viceroy that production had doubled. Although the amount might have been exaggerated, no one denied that there was a substantial increase in production. Because free trade was not reinstated at the same time, some supply problems continued for a few years, such as those of the metalworking artisans of México previously discussed. Prominent members of this group believed that copper dealers created the scarcity and that the price increase only served to enrich them further. Although this accusation may have been true in part, the higher price also served as an inducement to increase production. Within a year after the price rise treasury officials in Veracruz could inform the attorney in México that there was enough copper on hand to fill commitments to Spain and Havana, so that the 2,650 qq. in México could be held there until after the rainy season. Beginning in January 1802, requests for copper from silver miners and sugar mill owners in New Spain were approved with the notation that there was an adequate supply in the treasury's warehouses. In May 1802, treasury officials reported to the viceroy that they held in México and Acapulco 10,000 qq. of copper; in 1803 12,300 qq. were sent to Spain; in 1806 the intendent of Veracruz noted in a letter to the viceroy that since the price had increased, deliveries of copper were excessive 53 .
Government reaction to this increased flow of copper was to reconsider its policy of purchasing all copper delivered to treasury warehouses. As early as 1802 the viceroy ordered treasury officials in Veracruz to purchase no more than the amount of copper normally demanded abroad. By 1805 merchants were permitted to ship copper to Spain and Havana for their own account, and in 1809 the government abandoned its regulation of the distribution of copper entirely. At that time the treasury had accumulated 81,000 qq. of copper in its warehouses as a result of the English blockade of Spanish ports that became effective the previous year 54 .
When the Spanish Crown was willing to take the crucial action of an adequate price increase, the copper crisis was readily resolved.
